The 2014 Lepgold Prize was awarded to Professor Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) for his book, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Cornell University Press, 2014).
On Tuesday, October 27th, Professor Paul Staniland (University of Chicago) received the 2014 Joseph S. Lepgold Book Prize for his book, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Cornell University Press, 2014). The prize honors exceptional contributions to the study of international relations, with particular emphasis on the resolution of critical policy challenges, published each calendar year. Following the award presentation, Prof. Staniland discussed his research on how and why some insurgent groups become more effective than others. He presented his theoretical work through examples of rebels groups he studied during his fieldwork in N. Ireland, India, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka. Building on this empirical work, he provided a framework for understanding variations across insurgency structures, and distinguished four types of group organization: integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented. Following the lecture, Professor Staniland fielded questions from students and professors in the audience, considering topics such as current civil conflicts, secessionist groups, and insurgents’ ability to change over time.
Professor Staniland gave the Lepgold Book Prize Lecture on October 27th, 2015 at 4:30pm. Click below to watch the talk.
The Lepgold Prize Committee also awarded an Honorable Mention to Dr. Tana Johnson of Duke University for her book Organizational Progeny: Why Governments are Losing Control over the Proliferating Structures of Global Governance (Oxford University Press, 2014).
In life, delegation is fundamental. But it is difficult, especially when attempted internationally, as in the long delegation chains to the United Nations family and other global governance structures. There, much hinges on the design of delegation relationships. What prompts another entity to fall in line - and if it does not, what can be done? For international organizations, the conventional answer is simple: when designing institutions, member-states endow themselves with stringent control mechanisms, such as monopolization of financing or vetoes over decision-making in the new body.